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survive the temperature extremes en-
countered at reconnaissance altitudes;
Lundhal organized a photographic
interpretation activity to receive and
analyze the pictures.
When satellite-borne cameras replaced
the U-2, new and even more demand-
ing technical problems arose. Just get-
ting a satellite launched and into orbit
was no mean trick. Choosing between
relaying television pictures from space
or returning exposed film was a subtle
and demanding technical choice. Re-
covery of the exposed film was selected
and became the coolest trick of all: film
capsules, ejected from the satellite, re-
entered the atmosphere and parachuted
down to where a specially equipped
C-130 snagged them out of the air.
All this seems quite ordinary today, but
in the 1950s these were innovative
technical accomplishments. Too often
strategic histories treat critical technical
accomplishments lightly and gloss over
their significance to strategic and policy
choices. To Taubman’s credit, he is at-
tuned to the importance of the enabling
technologies and brings their role and
impact to the reader’s understanding.
After getting the cameras aloft,
Taubman turns his attention to the
consequences of the pictures they re-
turned. The first flights captured stag-
gering numbers of detailed pictures
covering vast sweeps of the hidden inte-
rior of the Soviet Union. The pictures
revealed that Soviet Bison bombers
were as rare as the animal is today in
Montana and that Soviet intercontinen-
tal missiles, while large and ugly, were
few and in a low state of readiness.
This did not end the Cold War or put
America completely at ease, but it did
bring some balance and scope to
defense planning for the late 1950s. In
1960 a presidential candidate who
should be remembered for better things
rode to victory partly on claims that the
Eisenhower administration had allowed
a dangerous missile gap to grow. The
pictures from these satellites and air-
craft put paid to that.
Taubman’s book is twice valuable—
first, for its historical development of
the value and impact of strategic intelli-
gence, and second, for its insight into
the role of technology and technologists
in shaping strategic policy.
In his final pages, Taubman raises im-
portant questions about America’s cur-
rent reliance on technical intelligence
collection methods. He notes that little
about al-Qa‘ida’s activities or capabili-
ties is being revealed or forecast by sat-
ellite reconnaissance and that human
intelligence sources and the collection
of intelligence must play a central role
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When we look back on great historical
events, we often ascribe an inevitability
to things that were, in fact, anything but.
In this lucid and comprehensive study of
the formulation and enactment of the
Marshall Plan, John Bonds recounts how
this great pillar of American post–World
War II policy was anything but inevita-
ble. Bonds, a retired captain of the U.S.
Navy and professor of history at the
Citadel in Charlestown, South Carolina,
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concludes his penultimate chapter on
the final legislative approval of what
was to be Public Law 793 with the
words: “So it was finally done. The
country had made a significant com-
mitment to Europe and to internation-
alism in general, consciously and with
conviction, despite some difficult
holdouts like Mr. John Taber, Chair-
man, House Appropriations Commit-
tee. But to the last the issue had been in
doubt.” On that last sentence (emphasis
added) hangs the tale of this study.
The Republicans controlled Congress,
the president was seen as weak and was
opposed by prominent members of his
own party, and the Republicans smelled
a White House victory in 1948, for the
first time since 1928. On partisan
grounds alone, then, 1947–48 did not
seem a propitious time for a major bi-
partisan initiative. Beyond consider-
ations of party, however, there were
large substantive policy issues that di-
vided the nation: how best to deal with
the erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union; fear
of inflation and the ultimate cost of Eu-
ropean recovery; concern for balancing
the budget; and how to meet the public
desire for “normalcy” after years of de-
pression and war.
Bonds gives an impressive account of the
extraordinary skill of the Truman ad-
ministration and the rightly celebrated
Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Re-
publican chairman of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, in
mobilizing business, labor, intellectu-
als, and public opinion in support of
what many correctly perceived as a de-
cisive break with traditional American
foreign policy. In this mobilization of
external opinion and lobbying of con-
gressional support (at a time when such
lobbying was seen as improper), there
were mutually countervailing pressures
tending to minimize President Truman’s
public engagement, which was seen as
raising partisan hackles, but also to max-
imize the president’s public role, the
better to position him for the 1948 elec-
tion. Bonds correctly concludes, how-
ever, that such considerations and skills
were insufficient to account for the final
enactment.
A fundamental change of perspective
was required, and skillful alliance build-
ing and sales strategies were inadequate.
Indeed, the administration understood
this and sought to justify the shift in
American peacetime engagement by the
need to restore the European balance of
power and the international trading
system, ravaged by depression and war.
At the same time, there was a desire to
establish for the first time in American
history a program of universal military
training. In the mind of the president,
Secretary of State George C. Marshall,
and Secretary of Defense James V.
Forrestal, the European Recovery Pro-
gram and a new foundation for national
defense were inextricably linked.
In the event, none of these arguments,
or the general campaign to weld an alli-
ance of business, labor, academia, and
the public in support of America’s new
role, generated sufficient votes in Con-
gress to pass the Marshall Plan. Soviet
actions in Finland, Czechoslovakia, and
Berlin did.
All of this is particularly remarkable in
view of the fact that the administration
had consciously sought to downplay the
Soviet menace as the motive for its ini-
tiative. More abstract discussions of the
balance of power and international
commerce were consistently favored.
This stemmed from the desire neither
to slam the door on some renewed
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understanding with the Soviet Union (a
position favored by some influential
opinions in the United States) nor to cre-
ate trouble for the French government,
seemingly both dependent on and threat-
ened by the French Communist Party.
The Soviet-menace card was played on
several occasions in the unfolding de-
bate, but in general it was subordinated
to more abstract arguments of enlight-
ened self-interest. Moreover, it was
clear to many in the administration that
too great an emphasis on the immi-
nence of war with Russia would scuttle
both the recovery program and univer-
sal military training in favor of a gen-
eral wartime mobilization. In effect,
although Soviet pressures certainly pro-
vided the needed ingredient for legisla-
tive success, they also had the potential
to divert the country from the recovery
program itself. Later events would ulti-
mately modify the balance between eco-
nomic assistance and military
mobilization—but that is another story,
beyond the scope of this fine book.
Finally, it should be noted that Bonds
has the ability to tell a story clearly, at
times even breezily, and analyze with-
out cumbersome jargon. For clarity and
sophistication, this is likely to be a stan-
dard reference for some time to come.
ROBERT S. WOOD
Salt Lake City, Utah
Hore, Peter, ed. Patrick Blackett: Sailor, Scientist,
Socialist. Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 2003. 330pp.
$59.50
Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett was a
key member of the international circle
of scientists who led the Allied defense
research efforts of World War II, and
he was the heart and soul of the Cold
War military-academic-industrial com-
plex. In this book, sixteen authors at-
tempt to shed light on Blackett’s role in
that story. The collection includes pa-
pers presented at a 1998 conference
commemorating Blackett at Cambridge
University, as well as other recent writ-
ings about him.
Not surprisingly, the compendium of-
fers a range of perspectives on events
and issues with which Blackett was as-
sociated, rather than a comprehensive
examination of his life and work. The
articles are arranged in roughly chrono-
logical order, but there is otherwise lit-
tle integration among them—a
characteristic only exacerbated by
Blackett’s wide-ranging interests and
expertise. However, it is clear that an
integrated whole was not the editor’s
goal. Instead, Hore’s intent was to aug-
ment the inadequate body of literature
on Blackett by encouraging new research
on him and publishing the results.
After an opening overview of Blackett’s
youth, compiled from Blackett’s own
autobiographical notes, the book cov-
ers his education in the Royal Navy’s
preparatory school system, his service
as a naval officer during World War I,
and his post-secondary and graduate
education in physics at Cambridge
University under the tutelage of Sir
Ernest Rutherford. After a summary of
Blackett’s contribution to Britain’s war
preparation efforts during the 1930s,
several chapters are devoted to his war-
time work on defense science, technol-
ogy, and policy. This material addresses
his widely acknowledged leadership in
the field of operational research and the
ways in which that research contributed
to high-level disputes over convoying
strategy and strategic-bombing policy.
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